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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
TRAVIS BERTOCH, : Case No. 20030111-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Illegal 
Possession/Use of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2001), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs presiding. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(2002). See Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction). 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Whether the trial court erred by ruling the evidence discovered due to the 
frisk should not be suppressed because the frisk did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
Issue II: Whether the trial court erred by ruling the pre-Miranda statements should 
not be suppressed because they did not violate the Fifth Amendment. 
Standard of Review: '"The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
erroneous standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a 
measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the 
facts.'" State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6,f7, 994 P.2d 1278 (citation omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant Travis Bertoch's (Bertoch) arguments that the trial court erred by 
denying his motion to suppress the evidence discovered in exploitation of the illegal frisk 
and the pre-Miranda statements are preserved at Court Record (R.) 47 (Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress); 172 (Defendant's Reply to State's Opposition to Motion to 
Suppress); 295 (Motion Hearing); 287 (Trial Court's Ruling); 296:5 (Plea Hearing). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following are determinative of the issues on appeal. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for 
questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if 
he reasonably believes he or another person is in danger. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Bertoch was charged by information with one count Unlawful Possession of a 
2 
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Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2001), Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2001), Unlawful 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998), and Improper Position of License Plate, a class C misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-404(3) (1998). R. 2-5. 
A preliminary hearing was conducted on March 14, 2002. R. 31-32; 289. 
Trooper Christopher Witte (Witte)1 testified for the prosecution. R. 289:4-27. The trial 
court bound Bertoch over on all charges. IJL at 29-30. On April 22, 2002, Bertoch 
moved to suppress the evidence against him. R. 47-77. The State responded on May 14, 
2002. R. 139-51. Bertoch replied on June 10, 2002. R. 172-79. A motion hearing was 
conducted on September 27, 2002. R. 295. On September 30, 2002, the trial court 
denied Bertoch's motion to suppress. R. 287 (see. Addendum B). 
On October 4, 2002, Bertoch pleaded guilty to one count of Unlawful Possession 
of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, but reserved his "right to appeal [the 
trial court's] ruling on [his] motion to suppress." R. 229-236, 296:5. On December 16, 
2002, the trial court sentenced Bertoch to "an indeterminate term of not to exceed five 
years in the Utah State Prison," but suspended this sentence. R. 242. The trial court also 
1
 Witte is incorrectly identified in the preliminary hearing transcript as Trooper 
Christopher Woody. R. 289:3-4. 
3 
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sentenced Bertoch to 365 days in jail with credit for time served and placed Bertoch on 
thirty-six months probation. R. 243. On February 6, 2003, Bertoch filed a motion to 
extend time for filing notice of appeal because, "[although Defendant timely filed a 
Notice of Appeal in this matter, the caption on the Notice of Appeal was inadvertently 
typed with errors in the District Court Case number." R. 247-48. Also on February 6, 
2003, the trial court granted Bertoch's motion to extend and Bertoch filed a notice of 
appeal. R. 255-56; 257-58. Bertoch is currently incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
On September 19, 2001, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Witte was "traveling 
eastbound on SR 201." R. 79; 92. He was on duty, in uniform, and armed. R. 79; 92; 
107; 289:4, 15. He "observed a maroon Ford Contour" with a "license plate that was 
improperly displayed" because the car "lacked a rear trunk" lid. R. 79; 92; 107; 289:4-5. 
The license plate "was laying flat" in "the back window" so he could not read the 
numbers. R. 79; 92; 107; 289:5. Witte did not immediately pull Bertoch over. R. 
289:13. Instead, he followed the vehicle because he "[j]ust wanted to follow the vehicle. 
2
 No evidence was offered at the motion hearing. R. 295. Consequently, the 
evidence the trial court relied on in making its ruling consists of: Witte's preliminary 
hearing testimony (R. 289:4-27); Utah Highway Patrol DUI Report (R. 79-82); DUI 
Summons and Citation (R. 84); Utah Highway Patrol Incident Report (R. 91-94); Vehicle 
Impound Report (R. 96-97); Field Sobriety Tests Worksheet (R. 99); Evidence and 
Property Reports (R. 101-03); Preliminary Toxicology Report (R. 105); Salt Lake County 
No Warrant Arrest Fact Sheet (R. 107-08); and Affidavit of Don Bertoch (R. 122,135-
36). R. 224, 287. 
4 
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Also-possibly get a driving pattern. As I believe, 201 is not the safest place to stop a 
vehicle. I hoped the subject was just going to stay on 1-15 so I could make a safe traffic 
stop, because I've been rear-ended twice on the freeway." R. 289:13. A fter following 
Bertoch's vehicle "onto southbound SR 15 (1-15), then onto eastbound SR 80 (1-80)," 
Witte "initiated a traffic stop." R. 92; 107; 289:5, 13. 
Witte "made contact with the driver, Mr. Bertoch, and smelled the odor of an 
alcoholic beverage emanating from the driver." R. 92; 107; 289:6. He asked Bertoch for 
Bertoch's driver's license and registration and Bertoch complied. R. 289:13-14. Witte 
"did not run [the license and registration] at that time." R. 289:6, 14. Witte told Bertoch 
that "I did smell an alcoholic beverage on him and asked him how much he had to 
drink." R. 92; 107; 289:14. Bertoch said "he had had two beers to drink." R. 92; 107. 
Witte then asked Bertoch to "exit the vehicle" and Bertoch complied. R. 92; 107; 289:6, 
14,16. At this point, Bertoch was no longer "free to leave." R. 107; 289:24. Witte 
intended to "run the subject through uniform field sobriety tests" because "he had 
consumed an alcoholic beverage that was present on his breath." R. 107; 289:7. 
Witte "usually ask[ed] people if there's anything on them I should be concerned 
about, any type of weapons or any needles," and he "believe[d]" he asked Bertoch if 
Bertoch was armed even though he did not see "any visible weapons." R. 289:16-17. 
Then Witte "performed a Terry frisk," by "patt[ing] the subject's waistline and his 
pockets and his pants and his shirt." R. 92; 107; 289:6, 14, 17. Prior to conducting the 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Terry frisk, the only unusual aspects of the stop were "the smell of alcohol" and "the 
vehicle did not have a rear trunk." R. 289:14. Witte said the missing trunk lid was a 
"suspicion" because "the trunk contains the license plate bracket. And if a vehicle is 
missing the license plate bracket, it was probably missing its license plate, as well. There 
could be a possibility of it being a stolen vehicle." Id. at 15. 
During the frisk, Witte "felt a hard object in the subject's left front pants pocket." 
R. 92; 107; 289:7, 17. Witte "recognized this as a pipe." R. 92; 107; 289:7-8, 17. At the 
preliminary hearing, Witte admitted it is possible "there are other possible uses for a tube, 
other than marijuana," and that he could not "immediately tell that that pipe was used for 
marijuana." R. 289:17, 18-19, 22-23. Upon feeling the object, Witte said, "This is a 
pipe." R. 92; 289:8, 18-19. In response, Bertoch "also agreed that it was." Id Bertoch 
"later on stated that he also had marijuana in his right front pants pocket with lighters." 
R. 92; 289:8. Witte "asked [Bertoch] when he had smoked marijuana last. [Bertoch] 
stated that he had smoked it the night before at about 7 o'clock." R. 107. Witte 
instructed Bertoch to "leave the items in his pockets." R. 92. 
Next, Witte conducted field sobriety tests. R. 92; 107; 289:7. Even though Witte 
admitted Bertoch was not the "drunkest person" he had ever seen, Witte concluded 
Bertoch failed because he lacked "smooth pursuit in both eyes"; had "[d]istinct 
nystagmus at maximum deviation in both eyes"; "swayed" and "raised his arms for 
balance" during the one leg stand; and "[c]ould not keep his balance twice," "raised his 
6 
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arms" once, and "performed an improper turn by pivoting on both feet" during the walk 
and turn test. R. 80; 99; 289:26. During the test, Bertoch informed Witte that "his right 
ankle had been broken a couple of times." R. 80; 99. Bertoch's brother, Don Bertoch, 
signed an affidavit saying Bertoch had injured his toe shortly before September 19, 2001. 
R. 122; 135. During the tests, Witte discovered Bertoch's tongue "was very green with 
blisters" and his eyes had "[r]edness." R. 79-80; 99; 108. 
Following the tests, Witte arrested Bertoch for driving under the influence of 
alcohol and/or drugs or with a measurable amount of a controlled substance or metabolite 
in his body (DUI). R. 80; 92; 108; 289:7-8. Then, acting on the earlier frisk, Witte 
retrieved from Bertoch's pockets a "pipe with burned residue and a plastic baggie with a 
green leafy substance that smelled and appeared to be marijuana." R. 92; 289:8. He also 
obtained Bertoch's "name, date of birth and social security number." R. 92. Trooper 
Greg Hopkins (Hopkins), acting as Witte's backup, conducted an inventory search of 
Bertoch's vehicle and found cigarettes and zig-zag papers. R. 80; 96; 108; 289:11-12. 
Next, Witte asked Bertoch to consent to a chemical test and Bertoch replied, "I 
guess they can come take my blood." R. 80. Witte "transported Mr. Bertoch to the 
Chevron gas station" where the blood technician "took a blood sample from Mr. 
Bertoch." R. 92; 108; 289:9. The blood test showed Bertoch's blood alcohol level to be 
.01 and returned negative for having marijuana or metabolite in the blood. R. 105. 
Finally, Witte took Bertoch "[t]o the Salt Lake County Jail to be booked on his 
7 
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charges." R. 92; 289:9. There, he read Bertoch the Miranda warnings and Bertoch 
"agreed to speak with me." R. 81; 92; 289:9-10. Bertoch told Witte that in the past three 
hours he had "[sjhowered, clean[ed] room, put away dishes, had 2 beers." R. 81. Then, 
while Deputy Brandon Peterson (Peterson) "was processing" Bertoch, Peterson 
"discovered a small white plastic battery container, containing a white powdery 
substance." R. 92; 108; 289:9-10. Peterson "called" Witte over and showed him the 
container. R. 92; 289:9-10. Peterson or Witte questioned Bertoch about the container 
and Bertoch "stated that it was quote meth." R. 92; 108; 289:9-10. 
In the resulting prosecution, Bertoch moved the trial court to suppress: (1) 
Bertoch's pre-Miranda statements because they were obtained while he was under 
custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings, (2) the pipe and 
marijuana because the Terry frisk exceeded Witte's authority, (3) the zig-zag paper 
because the search was not a valid search incident to arrest, (4) Bertoch's post-Miranda 
statements because he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights, and 
(5) the battery container because the description of the container changed during the 
chain of custody. R. 57-76. The State responded the evidence should not be suppressed 
because: (1) Bertoch's pre-Miranda statements were taken when Bertoch was not under 
custodial interrogation, (2) the pipe, marijuana and zig-zag paper were obtained through 
valid searches incident to arrest, (3) Bertoch knowingly waived his Miranda rights before 
giving his post-Miranda statements, and (4) the reliability of the battery container 
8 
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evidence was a question for the jury. R. 141-50. 
The trial court denied Bertoch's motion. R. 287:3. First, the trial court ruled 
Bertoch's pre-Miranda statements were admissible because the "Court's considering it to 
be an investigatory stop. It was a DUI stop." IcL The trial court continued: 
Even though . . . the officer could smell alcohol- that is not 
enough in and of itself a probable cause for an arrest. Mr. 
Bertoch was not under arrest. This matter has been heard by 
Courts many times. The Court did not consider him under 
arrest, and the questions asked by the officer are preliminary 
investigatory questions such as, 'Have you been drinking,' 
and I think in this particular case Mr. Bertoch volunteered 
that he had a couple of beers, but the Court does not feel that 
he was in custody, and therefore Miranda had to be given 
before the statements could be admitted. 
Also, when the officer found the lump in his pocket 
and stated just to Mr. Bertoch that it felt like a pipe, the 
defendant responded on his own that it was a pipe, and then 
he also volunteered the information that he had marijuana and 
. . . a lighter in his other pocket. He also volunteered that he 
had been smoking marijuana. Again, these were still 
investigatory questions. 
14 
Second, the trial court ruled the pipe and marijuana were admissible because, 
"Once the officer smelled alcohol and took Mr. Bertoch out of the vehicle, he had a right 
to frisk him." Id. at 4. The trial court continued: 
I didn't find any evidence where the officer reached in his 
pocket and took these things out. It was Mr. Bertoch that 
volunteered that it was a pipe, and even though it could have 
been a pipe of tobacco or anything, at that point it didn't 
make a difference. There wasn't evidence about anything. 
The officer even told Mr. Bertoch to keep . . . the pipe and 
9 
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the other material in his pockets until later. 
LI In other words, the "initial stop was lawful because the license plate was unlawfully 
displayed, and the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have both told us that 
basically no matter how minute, if a traffic violation takes place, that gives rise to 
probable cause for the initial stop." IdL_ Accordingly, the evidence was "taken at the 
search incident to arrest. Mr. Bertoch was later arrested. At that point, the officer asked 
him to empty his pockets." Id 
Third, the trial court ruled the zig-zag paper was admissible because "it was found 
during the inventory search of the vehicle after the arrest was made, or it was found in 
the search incident to arrest at the time that Mr. Bertoch was arrested, even though it was 
done by a different officer." Id. at 4-5. Fourth, the trial court ruled Bertoch's post-
Miranda statements were admissible because, "I have heard no testimony whatsoever in 
any way that Mr. Bertoch was incapacitated to a point that he couldn't understand 
Miranda." IcL Fifth, the trial court ruled the battery container was admissible because "a 
different description of the same piece of evidence" is not "grounds to suppress the 
evidence." Id. at 6. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue I: A frisk violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
if it is not reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. If a frisk violates the Fourth 
Amendment then all primary and derivative evidence of the frisk must be excluded 
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unless it falls under an exception to the exclusionary rule. In this case, this Court should 
reverse because: (1) the trial court failed to consider the reasonableness of the frisk under 
the totality of the circumstances when ruling the frisk did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, (2) the frisk violated the Fourth Amendment, and (3) the evidence 
discovered during and after the frisk should have been suppressed . 
First, the trial court erred by upholding the frisk without considering the totality of 
the circumstances. An officer may perform a protective frisk pursuant to a lawful stop 
when the officer reasonably believes a person is armed and presently dangerous to the 
officer or others. The reasonableness of a frisk is evaluated objectively according to the 
totality of the circumstances. Here, the trial court did not evaluate the frisk for 
reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances. Instead, it assumed Witte had the 
right to frisk Bertoch once he smelled alcohol and took Bertoch out of the vehicle. 
Second, the frisk violated the Fourth Amendment because it was unreasonable 
under the totality of the circumstances. First, the reasons for the stop and detention 
negated the reasonableness argument because DUI and minor traffic violations do not 
imply dangerous propensities. Second, Bertoch's manner negated the reasonableness 
argument because he was compliant and non-threatening throughout the stop. Third, 
Witte's subjective opinion negated the reasonableness argument because he personally 
witnessed the circumstances surrounding the stop and did not feel threatened. Fourth, 
Witte alleviated any inherent danger in the stop by having Bertoch exit the vehicle. 
11 
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Fifth, the time and place of the stop negated the reasonableness argument because the 
stop occurred on a busy freeway at a time when many people would be driving by. 
Third, the evidence discovered during and after the frisk should be suppressed. 
Evidence obtained primarily though exploitation of police illegality should be 
suppressed. Here, the physical evidence should be suppressed because the DUI 
investigation was not sufficiently distinguishable from the frisk to purge the taint of the 
frisk. Second, the pre- and post-Miranda statements should be suppressed because they 
were not voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, and they were not attenuated 
from the illegal frisk. 
Issue II: Bertoch's pre-Miranda statements should have been suppressed because 
they were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. An accused person in custody 
must be given the Miranda warnings prior to the time a statement is taken. A person is in 
custody when the setting is accusatory rather than investigatory. Here, Bertoch was in 
custody when his pre-Miranda statements were taken because the investigation was 
focused solely on Bertoch, the objective indicia of arrest were present, and the length and 
form of the interrogation showed Bertoch was in custody. 
ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED BY RULING THE TERRY FRISK DID NOT 
VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the 'right of 
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the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.'*' State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) (quoting U.S. 
Const, amend. IV). "'[Shopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a 
seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." IcL. (quoting Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). 
Although "a search 'is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person' and 
should not be taken lightly,'" an officer "may perform a protective frisk pursuant to a 
lawful stop when the officer reasonably believes a person is 'armed and presently 
dangerous to the officer or others.'" State v. Warren. 2003 UT 36,113, 78 P.3d 590 
(quoting Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17,24 (1968)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 
(1999) ("A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for questioning may frisk 
the person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or another person is in 
danger."); State v. Rovbal, 716 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986) (holding section 77-7-16 must 
be interpreted to meet "constitutional requirements of Terry"). The reasonableness of a 
frisk is "evaluated objectively according to the totality of the circumstances." Warren. 
2003 UT 36 at 1flj 14, 25 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce. 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). "Tf a protective search goes beyond what is 
necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its 
fruits will be suppressed.'" Id. at [^13 (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson. 508 U.S. 366, 
373 (1993) (citation omitted)); see also id. ("The sole purpose for allowing the frisk is to 
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protect the officer and other prospective victims by neutralizing potential weapons." 
(citing Michigan v.Long. 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 n. 14 (1983); Terry. 392 U.S. at24)). 
In this case, this Court should reverse because: (1) the trial court failed to consider 
the reasonableness of the frisk under the totality of the circumstances when ruling the 
frisk did not violate the Fourth Amendment, (2) the frisk violated the Fourth Amendment 
because it was unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances, and (3) the primary 
and derivative evidence of the frisk should have been suppressed . 
A, The Trial Court Erred By Holding the Frisk Was Constitutional Without 
Considering Its Reasonableness Under the Totality of the Circumstances. 
"In Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court held that an officer may 
perform a protective frisk pursuant to a lawful stop when the officer reasonably believes 
a person is 'armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others.'" Warren, 2003 UT 
36 at [^13 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24); see also State v. White, 856 P.2d at 656, 665 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding the authority to "permit a protective frisk for weapons 
'must be narrowly drawn'" (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27)). "The reasonableness of a 
Terry frisk depends 'on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to 
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers,'" and is "evaluated 
objectively according to the totality of the circumstances." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ffl|14, 
25 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878); see also Terry, 392 
U.S. at 24-25 (holding "[e]ven a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons 
constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must 
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surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience"). 
"To determine reasonableness, a court should question whether 'the facts available 
to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate."'" Warren. 2003 UT 36 at ^ |14 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22). "The Terry court proclaimed that the officer must be 
able to point to specific facts which, considered with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant the intrusion." IcL (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). "'[D]ue weight 
must be given, not to [an officer's] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," 
but to specific reasonable inference which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts 
in light of his experience.'" Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). 
In this case, the trial court ruled the frisk was constitutional because, "Once the 
officer smelled alcohol and took Mr. Bertoch out of the vehicle, he had a right to frisk 
him." R. 287:4. By so ruling, the trial court completely failed to consider whether Witte 
acted reasonably under the totality of the circumstances. IdL Instead, the trial court 
concluded that Witte had an automatic right to frisk Bertoch simply because he "smelled 
alcohol" and "took Mr. Bertoch out of the vehicle." Id_ However, neither the smell of 
alcohol nor the removal of a defendant from a vehicle justify a Terry frisk. First, the 
smell of alcohol does not justify a frisk because it does not suggest the presence of 
dangerous weapons. See Warren, 2003 UT 36 at [^13 ("The sole purpose for allowing the 
frisk is to protect the officer and other prospective victims by neutralizing potential 
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weapons." (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 n. 14; Terry. 392 U.S. at 24)); Wayne R. 
LeFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise On the Fourth Amendment § 9.5(a), at 256-57 
(1996 & Supp. 2004) (noting "driving under the influence and lesser traffic offenses" do 
not suggest "dangerous propensities"); see Section I.B.I. Second, the removal of a 
defendant from a vehicle actually alleviates the need for a Terry frisk because it 
diminishes any danger the traffic stop may pose. See Warren. 2003 UT 36 at [^22 
(holding the inherent danger of traffic stops "can be fully or partially mitigated by 
ordering the occupants out of the vehicle"); see. Section I.B.4. This is especially true 
where, as here, the defendant is removed from the vehicle because the officer wants to 
conduct field sobriety tests, not because the officer fears the defendant may have a 
dangerous weapon. R. 92; 107; 289:6-7, 14, 16. 
Besides, an officer never has an automatic right to frisk, but must demonstrate the 
need to frisk under the totality of the circumstances by "point[ing] to specific facts 
which, considered with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the 
intrusion." Warren. 2003 UT 36 at ^ [14 (citing Terry. 392 U.S. at 21); see also Ybarra v. 
Illinois. 444 U.S. 85, 94 (1979) ("The 'narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not 
permit a frisk for weapons on less than a reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the 
person to be frisked." (emphasis added)). 
B. The Frisk Violated the Fourth Amendment Because It Was Unreasonable 
Under the Totality of the Circumstances. 
In Warren, our supreme court demonstrated the type of analysis necessary to 
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determine whether a frisk was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. 
Warren, 2003 UT 36 at [^30 (f,clarif[ying] the analysis for evaluating the reasonableness 
of a Terry frisk1'). In that case, an officer saw the defendant's vehicle stopped at 4:45 
a.m. with a "male leaning into an open passenger door." Id, at f3. The officer 
"suspected drug activity or prostitution based on the hour of the day and the deserted 
downtown location." IcL When the driver pulled away, the officer stopped him "for 
failure to signal." IdL at ^|4. Upon request, the defendant gave the officer his registration 
and an expired license, claiming his current license "had been stolen." Id_ The officer 
discovered the defendant's license was invalid and decided to impound the car. L±_ at [^5. 
The officer asked the defendant to exit the car and the defendant complied. IcL The 
officer also asked the defendant if he had any weapons and the defendant said "he did 
not." IdL at [^6. The officer then frisked the defendant "as a matter of routine." IdL_ 
Our supreme court granted certiorari and affirmed this Court's decision that the 
frisk violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1fl[9-105 Tfl|32-34. First, the supreme court 
acknowledged this Court's decision that the frisk was unreasonable because "lesser 
traffic offenses are not suggestive of weapons and that neither the lateness of the hour 
nor [the defendant's] lie regarding his license was suggestive of weapons." Id^ at <[[32. 
The supreme court then listed "other" relevant circumstances, comparing "the inherent 
dangerousness of a traffic stop," the late hour, the "deserted downtown location," the 
defendant's lie, the "need to impound" the car, and the officer's suspicion of "drug 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
activity or prostitution"; against the defendant's "cooperative behavior, his response that 
he did not have any weapons on him, his willing compliance with the order to exit his 
vehicle, and [the officer's] testimony that [the defendant] did nothing to cause [him] to 
be alarmed and that he had no reason to believe that [the defendant] was armed and 
dangerous." IcL After weighing these circumstances, the supreme court concluded the 
frisk was not reasonable because the facts establishing suspicion were "too attenuated"; 
the defendant's "cooperativeness, denial of being armed, and the absence of alarming 
actions further negated the reasonableness argument"; the officer "was present and 
observed all the factors, but testified repeatedly that he did not have any reason to believe 
that [the defendant] was armed and dangerous"; and removing the defendant from the car 
"decreased the inherent dangerousness of the traffic stop." Id. at ^ [33. 
Similarly, in this case, Witte's frisk of Bertoch was not reasonable under the 
totality of the circumstances because the reasonableness argument was negated by: (1) 
Witte's reasons for the stop and detention, (2) Bertoch's cooperative, non-threatening 
manner, (3) Witte's lack of fear of a dangerous weapon, (4) Bertoch's compliance with 
Witte's request to exit the vehicle, and (5) the time and place of the stop. 
1. Witte's Reasons For the Stop and Detention Negated the Reasonableness 
Argument. 
In cases such as "robbery, burglary, rape, assault with weapons, homicide and 
dealing in large quantities of narcotics," an "officer's reasonable belief may derive as 
much from his experience in similar cases as from his precise knowledge of the 
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dangerous propensities of the suspect at hand." LeFave, § 9.5(a) at 255-56 (footnotes 
and quotation omitted). 
But for other types of crimes, such as trafficking in small 
quantities of narcotics, possession of marijuana, illegal 
possession of liquor, prostitution, bookmaking, shoplifting, 
passing bad checks, illegal possession, underage drinking, 
driving under the influence and lesser traffic offenses, minor 
assault without weapons, or vagrancy, as well as when the 
stop is for a legitimate noncriminal reason or when the 
officer's duties otherwise necessitate his being in close 
proximity to the individual, there must be, as Justice Harlan 
noted in Terry, 'other circumstances' present. 
Id. at 256-57 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at.34 (Harlan, 
J., concurring)). 
Here, when Witte first stopped Bertoch, he only suspected Bertoch of committing 
a simple equipment violation. R. 79; 92; 107; 289:4-5. In fact, even though Witte 
followed Bertoch before pulling Bertoch over, he never saw Bertoch commit an actual 
traffic violation. R. 289:13. Later, Witte decided to test Bertoch for DUI. R. 92; 107; 
289:6. However, DUI is also not a crime from which an officer can derive a reasonable 
fear of danger. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 (holding frisk permissible where officer 
suspected defendant was involved in a "daylight robbery - which, it is reasonable to 
assume, would be likely to involve the use of weapons"); State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 
1092 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (noting officer might reasonably frisk 
people suspected of dealing large quantities of illegal drugs over long distances because 
they "might be armed to protect themselves from criminals who might attempt to 'rip-off 
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a drug dealer"). Otherwise, an officer would be authorized to frisk every person he 
suspected of drunk driving. See. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 94 (1979) ("The 'narrow scope5 of 
the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than a reasonable belief 
or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked." (emphasis added)); White. 856 P.2d at 
665 (holding "balancing defendant's right to be free of unreasonable interference against 
the police officers' right to protect themselves or others weighs against validating an 
automatic frisk based on [suspected].. . cocaine use" because cocaine use "is not a crime 
of violence comparable to dealing in large quantities of drugs"). 
2. Bertoch's Cooperative, Non-threatening Manner Negated the 
Reasonableness of the Frisk. 
The reasonableness of a frisk is repudiated where the defendant acts in a 
cooperative, non-threatening manner. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93 (holding frisk 
unconstitutional where defendant "made no gestures or other actions indicative of an 
intent to commit an assault, and generally [acted] in a manner that was not threatening"); 
White, 856 P.2d at 666 (holding frisk unconstitutional where defendant "was cooperative 
and mellow and followed directions without protest"); State v. Rochelle , 850 P.2d 480, 
483 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (upholding frisk where "when asked whether he had any 
weapons, [defendant] 'was hesitant in answering no'"); United States v. Mitchell, No. 
02-4120, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6197 at *7 (10th Cir. March 31, 2003) (holding frisk 
unconstitutional even though defendant was in high-crime area, suspected of shoplifting, 
and had a jacket in his possession because he "took no action that caused the officer to 
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fear for his safety" and he "was cooperative, polite, and non-threatening"). 
Here, Bertoch's manner was cooperative and non-threatening. Bertoch stopped 
without hesitation and produced his license and registration immediately upon request. 
R. 92; 107; 289:5, 13-14. When Witte mentioned that he detected a smell of alcohol, 
Bertoch readily admitted "that he had had two beers to drink." R. 92; 107. Again, when 
Witte asked Bertoch to exit the car, Bertoch immediately complied. IdL Further, Witte 
had no reason to suspect Bertoch of being dangerous despite his compliant, non-
threatening manner because he did not recognize Bertoch as a criminal known for his 
violent propensity. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93 (noting that officers did not "recognize[] 
[defendant] as a person with a criminal history"); State v. Rovbah 716 P.2d 291, 293 
(Utah 1986) (upholding frisk of defendant who "had been arrested in conjunction with 
[an] earlier shooting incident" that occurred the same day). 
3. Witte's Lack of Subjective Fear Negates the Reasonableness of the Frisk. 
"[S]ubjective belief may be one of the factors in determining the reasonableness 
of an officer's decision to perform a Terry frisk" because an "officer's own evaluation of 
the circumstances may provide valuable insight to factor into the objective analysis." 
Warren, 2003 UT 36 at lfl[20-21 (holding frisk unreasonable because, among other 
reasons, the officer "was present and observed all the factors, but testified repeatedly that 
he did not have any reason to believe that [the defendant] was armed and dangerous") 
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22); see also State v. Muir. 777 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Idaho Ct. 
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App. 1989) ("While the determination for grounds for a frisk are judged against an 
objective standard of reasonableness, the test for validity of the search also entails a 
subjective element."); People v. Flowers, 688 N.E.2d 626, 630 (111. 1997) ("Although the 
standard is an objective one, the officer's subjective belief regarding the safety of the 
situation is one of the factors that may be considered in determining whether a weapons 
frisk was valid under Terry"). However, "a Terry frisk cannot be validated or invalidated 
based solely on a subjective belief because no one factor alone is determinative of 
reasonableness." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at «pi (citation omitted). 
Here, even with Bertoch removed from the car, Witte did not see any "visible 
weapons" or tell-tale bulges and did not worry that Bertoch was wearing clothes that 
might easily hide a weapon. R. 289:16-17; see. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93 (holding frisk 
unreasonable because "the most Agent [] could point to was that [defendant] was 
wearing a 3/4-length lumber jacket, clothing which the State admits could be expected on 
almost any tavern patron in Illinois in early March"); Rochelle, 850 P.2d 483 (upholding 
frisk where defendant "had a bulge in his pocket"); United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 
838, 842 (5 th Cir. 1994) (upholding frisk where defendant kept right hand in pocket, 
"precisely where a weapon could be located," even when he opened door and even 
though he had a beer in other hand). In fact, Witte was so unconcerned about a the 
presence of a dangerous weapon that he could not specifically recall whether he asked if 
Bertoch was carrying any weapons. R. 289:16-17; see. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (holding 
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4. Witte Alleviated Any Inherent Danger By Having Bertoch Exit the Vehicle. 
The "inherent dangerousness of all traffic stops is a factor to be considered in the 
totality of the circumstances analysis." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^ 22. "However, this 
danger can be fully or partially mitigated by ordering the occupants out of the vehicle" 
because "'establishing a face-to-face confrontation diminishes the possibility, otherwise 
substantial, that the driver can make unobserved movements.'" IcL at lfl[22, 27 (quoting 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms. 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977)). "Thus, both the inherent 
dangerousness of the traffic stop and any reduction in that danger resulting from ordering 
the occupants out of the vehicle should be factored into the totality of the circumstances 
analysis." Id. at ffl|22, 33 (holding frisk unreasonable because, among other reasons, 
removal of defendant from car decreased "inherent dangerousness of the traffic stop"). 
"In simple traffic stops where other indicia of dangerousness are absent, ordering 
the occupants of the vehicle out of the car clearly mitigates the inherent dangerousness of 
the stop." \<L at ^ |27. However, "even when not mitigated, the inherent dangerousness of 
a traffic stop alone is not determinative." IcL at ^  29. "The officer must still meet the 
requirements of Terry by pointing to specific and articulable facts which, taken together 
with the rational inferences from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to conclude 
that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous." IdL (citing Long, 463 U.S. at 
1049 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)). Here, the inherent dangerousness of the stop was 
alleviated when Bertoch exited the vehicle. Witte asked Bertoch to exit the vehicle and 
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Bertoch readily complied. R. 92; 107. Thus, any danger that Bertoch may have posed 
while he was in the vehicle and his movements were hidden from view was mitigated 
when Bertoch exited the vehicle without any hesitation or unusual behavior. IdL 
5. The Time and Place of the Stop Negated the Reasonableness of the Frisk. 
The time and place of a stop bolsters reasonableness only if it heightens the 
likelihood a person will possess a dangerous weapon. See State v. Despain, 2003 UT 
App 266,^12, 74 P.3d 1176 (upholding frisk because stop was conducted "about 
midnight," the officers were "accosted by an apparently dangerous dog," and defendant 
exited and reentered vehicle without instruction and repeatedly ignored officers' 
instructions); United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1987) (upholding 
frisk because "hour was late, the street was dark, the officer was alone, and the suspected 
crime was a burglary"). Further, even where time and place bolster the reasonableness of 
a frisk, they alone do not satisfy the reasonableness test. See. United States v. Rideau, 
969 F.2d 1572, 1575 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) ("Of course, that an individual is in a high 
crime neighborhood at night is not enough to support an officer's decision to stop and 
frisk him."); Anderson v. United States, 658 A.2d 1036, 1040 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995) 
("The Fourth Amendment requires that there must be more than a person being seen in an 
alley late at night, walking away from the police in a high crime area, who upon being 
questioned puts his hands back in his pockets and acts in a strange manner."). 
Here, the time and place weighed against the reasonableness of the frisk. Witte 
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stopped Bertoch on 1-80 near the State Street exit at 9:03 p.m. R. 91. There was no 
evidence presented suggesting this section of road was a high-crime area, was poorly lit, 
or was barren of its usual flow of traffic. R. 79; 92; 107; 289:13. In fact, this section of 
road is a freeway used at all times of day and night by all different members of society. 
Id. Further, there was no evidence suggesting Witte felt nervous about the place or time. 
Id. In fact, the only concern Witte raised was that he did not want to be rear-ended by 
other traffic during the stop, and Witte himself alleviated this concern by waiting for a 
safe section of road before initiating the stop. R. 289:13. 
Regardless, the time and place of the stop were meaningless in light of the other 
circumstances of the frisk. In Warren, our supreme court determined the frisk was 
unconstitutional even though it was conducted at 4:45 a.m. in a "deserted downtown 
location" because these facts could not outweigh the defendant's "cooperativeness, 
denial of being armed, and the absence of alarming actions"; the fact that the officer 
testified "he did not have any reason to believe that [the defendant] was armed and 
dangerous"; and the decreased danger due to the officer's removal of the defendant from 
the car. Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^|33. Similarly, Bertoch maintained a cooperative, non-
threatening manner throughout the stop; and Witte had no fear of a weapon and 
diminished any possible danger by having Bertoch exit the vehicle. See. Sections I.B.2-4. 
Therefore, as in Warren, the totality of the circumstances shows the frisk was not 
reasonable because Witte's reasons for stopping and detaining Bertoch negated the 
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possibility of a dangerous weapon; Bertoch's "cooperativeness" and "absence of 
alarming actions further negated the reasonableness argument"; although Witte "was 
present and observed all the factors," he was so unconcerned about a dangerous weapon 
that he could not recall asking if Bertoch was armed; and Witte "decreased the inherent 
dangerousness of the traffic stop" by removing Bertoch from the car. See Warren, 2003 
UT 36 at ^33. In fact, this frisk was even less reasonable than the unconstitutional frisk 
in Warren because here, unlike in Warren where the frisk was conducted at 4:45 a.m. in a 
deserted downtown location, the frisk was conducted on a busy freeway at a time when a 
constant flow of traffic would be present. 
£ . The Physical and Verbal Evidence Discovered During and After the 
Unconstitutional Frisk Should Have Been Suppressed. 
"Under the exclusionary rule, 'evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal 
search and seizure.'" State v. Zesiger. 2003 UT App 37,1(11, 65 P.3d 314 (quoting 
United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)). "The exclusionary rule 'also 
prohibits the introduction of derivative evidence . . . that is the product of. . . or that is 
otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful search.'" Id. (quoting Murray v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-37 (1988)); see also State v. McGrath. 928 P.2d 1033, 
1036 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("To deter violations of Fourth Amendment rights,. . . 
illegally-acquired evidence is inadmissible." (citing Weeks v. United States. 232 U.S. 
383, 398 (1914)); Warren. 2003 UT 36 at [^13 ("Tf a protective search goes beyond what 
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is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its 
fruits will be suppressed.5" (quoting Dickerson. 508 U.S. at 373 (citation omitted)). To 
determine whether evidence should be suppressed, courts "focus on whether the evidence 
resulted primarily from the '"exploitation of [the] illegality"' or '"by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."'" McGrath. 928 P.2d at 1036 
(alteration in original) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) 
(citation omitted)). Here, this Court should suppress the physical and verbal evidence 
because it was discovered by exploiting the illegal frisk. 
1. The Physical Evidence Should Be Suppressed Because It Was Discovered By 
Exploiting the Illegal Frisk. 
Although the physical evidence was not removed from Bertoch's pockets until 
after his DUI arrest, it should be suppressed because the DUI arrest was not sufficiently 
distinguishable from the illegal frisk to purge the taint of the frisk. Whether a person 
fails a field sobriety test rests on the subjective interpretation of the administering officer. 
See State v. Crawford, 68 P.3d 848, 851 (Mont. 2003) (listing field sobriety tests as 
"non-scientific, subjective indications of intoxication"); State v. Lorton , 829 A.2d 647, 
649 (N.H. 2003) ("Tt is the officer's subjective evaluation of the suspect that results in 
the determination of whether a "clue" is present or not.'" (citation omitted)); State v. 
Lombard, 505 A.2d 1182, 1186 (Vt. 1985) (acknowledging field sobriety tests 
"necessarily rest on the subjective observations of the testing officer"). Accordingly, by 
emphasizing some factors and ignoring others, an officer can fail a person even though 
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there is little evidence of impairment. See Lorton, 829 A.2d at 648-49 (holding 
insufficient evidence of impairment where defendant's "steps were one to two inches 
apart" and he "held his hands out 'slightly5 more than six inches from his side" during the 
walk-and-turn test conducted on edge of wet roadway because it was "just as rational to 
conclude [the defendant's] performance was attributable to innocent factors as it is to 
conclude that his performance was due to impairment"). Once an officer decides a 
person failed the field sobriety tests, he has probable cause to arrest the person for DUI 
and search incident to that arrest. See State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6,^ [ 15, 994 P.2d 
1278 (holding officer had "probable cause to believe that [defendant] was driving while 
under the influence of a controlled substance when he showed significant difficulty with 
five of the eight field tests"); State v. Allen. 970 P.2d 81, 83 (Mont. 1998) ("If the driver 
should fail the field sobriety tests, the officer would then have probable cause to arrest 
this individual for driving under the influence of alcohol."). 
In this case, the DUI arrest was determined by the results of the illegal frisk rather 
than the results of the field sobriety tests. Prior to the illegal frisk, Witte only suspected 
Bertoch of committing an equipment violation and drinking some alcohol, but not 
enough to illegally affect his driving. R. 79; 92; 107; 289:4-6, 13. Although Witte 
planned to perform field sobriety tests, these tests were merely a matter of course 
because, even after following Bertoch's car and questioning Bertoch, he had no evidence 
Bertoch was impaired. R. 107; 289:7, 13. Then, without any particularized reason to 
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suspect a weapon, Witte frisked Bertoch, felt a bulge he immediately "recognized" as 
paraphernalia, and compelled Bertoch's confession. R. 92; 107; 289:6-8, 14, 16-19. 
Having discovered drugs and obtained a confession, Witte back-pedaled, by leaving the 
evidence in Bertoch's pockets, and attempted to cure the taint of the illegal frisk by 
rediscovering the evidence through the DUI investigation. R. 80; 92; 99; 107; 289:7 
Specifically, Witte ensured a DUI arrest and search incident to that arrest, by 
summarily concluding Bertoch failed the field sobriety tests. R. 80; 99. Even though 
Bertoch had displayed no signs of impairment while driving, was actually not impaired,4 
and was ultimately never charged with DUI, he was arrested for DUI because, in Witte's 
frisk-clouded judgment, he failed the field sobriety tests. R. 2-5; 80; 99; 105; 289:13. 
However, in reaching this conclusion, Witte over-emphasized Bertoch's alleged mistakes 
without detailing how serious these mistakes actually were and completely disregarded 
the outside factors affecting Bertoch's performance, including Bertoch's normal 
apprehension after being stopped and ordered to perform field sobriety tests by an armed 
officer, Bertoch's heightened anxiety after being frisked and compelled to confess to 
criminal activity, Bertoch's belief that performing well was futile because the frisk 
guaranteed his arrest, and Bertoch's twice broken ankle and severely injured toe. R. 80; 
92; 99; 107; 122; 135; 289:7-8, 18-19. Witte also made no comment about how the 
4
 As revealed by the blood test, Bertoch's blood alcohol level was .01, well below 
the illegal level of .08, and his blood tested negative for marijuana or metabolite. R. 105; 
see Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a) (Supp. 2001). 
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condition of the road, the light, the noise, or the weather may have affected Bertoch's 
ability to hear the directions and perform the requested tasks. R. 80; 92; 107; 289:7; see 
Lorton, 829 A.2d at 648-49 (considering condition of roadway and weather in 
concluding there was insufficient evidence to uphold DUI conviction). 
2. Bertoch's Statements Should Be Suppressed Because They Were Compelled 
by Exploiting the Illegal Frisk. 
Incriminating statements, like physical evidence, are subject to the exclusionary 
rule if obtained through exploitation of police illegality. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485 
(holding "'verbal evidence . . . is no less the "fruit" of official illegality than the more 
common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion.'" (internal citation omitted)); State 
v. McGrath. 928 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (holding the exclusionary rule 
applies equally to physical and verbal evidence because "'the policies underlying the 
exclusionary rule' do not 'invite any logical distinction between physical and verbal 
evidence'" (citation omitted)). 
"In determining the validity of a confession or incriminating statements following 
police illegality, two inquiries must be made." State v. Allen. 839 P.2d 291, 300 (Utah 
1992). "First, the court must determine 'voluntariness,' i.e., whether the confession was 
voluntary; second, the court must determine 'attenuation,' i.e., whether the confession 
was obtained in the course of police exploitation of the prior illegality or, in other words, 
whether the voluntary confession was sufficiently attenuated from the police misconduct 
to remove any taint." Id Here, this Court should suppress Bertoch's statements because 
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they were not voluntary and were not attenuated from the illegal frisk. 
a. Voluntariness. fl[W]hether the requisite voluntariness exists depends on 'the 
totality of all the surrounding circumstances - both the characteristics of the accused and 
the details of police conduct/1 State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990) (citing 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)); see also State v. Thurman. 846 
P.2d 1256, 1262-63 (Utah 1993) (same); Allen. 839 P.2d at 300 (holding "the inquiry 
into voluntariness is never mechanical, but must duly consider both the characteristics of 
the accused and the details of the interrogation" (citation omitted)). "The ultimate 
inquiry is, of course, whether physical or psychological force or other improper threats or 
promises prompted the accused to talk when he otherwise would not have done so." 
Allen. 839 P.2d at 300. 
Here, Bertoch's pre-Miranda statements were not voluntary. Witte was armed and 
in full uniform. R. 79; 92; 107; 289:4, 15. He stopped Bertoch and ordered Bertoch out 
of the car. R. 92; 107; 289:6. Then, even though Bertoch was cooperative and non-
threatening, Witte illegally frisked Bertoch and discovered paraphernalia. R. 92; 107; 
289:6, 13-14, 16. Next, with his hands still on Bertoch's body, Witte said he knew 
Bertoch was hiding paraphernalia and compelled Bertoch to confirm this knowledge 
without first informing Bertoch of the right to remain silent. R. 92; 107; 289:7-8, 18-19; 
see Section II. Collectively, these circumstances prompted Bertoch to confess and 
provide incriminating information when he otherwise would not have. See United States 
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v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 977 n. 4 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Of course, the fact of physical contact is 
relevant to the reasonableness of a suspect's perception that he is under arrest.11); United 
States v. Perea, 986 F.2d 633, 645 (2d Cir. 1993) (same); Section II. 
Similarly, Bertoch's post-Miranda statements were not voluntary. By the time 
Bertoch received the Miranda warnings, he had been stopped, frisked, compelled to 
admit possession of drugs and paraphernalia, ordered to perform field sobriety tests, 
arrested, handcuffed, searched, required to watch his vehicle being searched, given a 
blood test, transported in a patrol car twice, and detained at police headquarters. R. 80; 
92; 96; 99; 105; 107-08; 289:5, 7-9, 13, 18-19. In other words, when he was finally told 
he had the right to remain silent, he had already told everything. Id. Thus, he had no 
reason to remain silent. Id Rather, his only hope was to cooperate fully and hope for 
leniency. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949) (holding if confession is "product 
of sustained pressure by the police it does not issue from a free choice"); People v. 
Johnson, 636 N.Y.S.2d 540, 545 (N.Y. 1995) ("While a series of circumstances may each 
alone be insufficient to cause a confession to be deemed involuntary, collectively such 
circumstances may have that qualitative or quantitative effect."). 
b. Exploitation of Police Illegality. Factors to be considered in an exploitation 
analysis "' include temporal proximity of the illegality and the evidence sought to be 
suppressed, the presence of intervening factors, and the purpose and flagrancy of the 
misconduct." State v. Small, 829 P.2d 129, 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted); 
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see also State v. Lovegren. 829 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Here, Bertoch's 
statements both before and after receiving the Miranda warnings must be suppressed. 
Alone, the purpose and flagrancy of Witte's misconduct suggests Bertoch's 
statements should be suppressed. See. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264 (holding "if the 
purpose of the misconduct was to achieve the [incriminating statements], suppression of 
the resulting evidence clearly will have a deterrent effect and further analysis rarely will 
be required"). The fact that Witte decided to frisk Bertoch even though he had stopped 
Bertoch for a simple equipment violation and had so little fear of danger that he could 
not even recall asking if Bertoch was armed, "strongly suggests that the purpose of 
[Witte's] actions was not to discover whether" Bertoch was carrying a dangerous 
weapon, "but rather to use that as an excuse to permit him to search" for drugs or 
paraphernalia. Lovegren, 829 P.2d at 159; see Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31 (holding officer 
is entitled to frisk only where "he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable 
inquires, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his 
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety"). In other words, the purpose and flagrancy 
of Witte's illegal search demonstrates the likelihood that he "engaged in the conduct as a 
pretext for collateral objectives, and suppressing the resulting evidence will have a 
greater likelihood of deterring similar misconduct in the future." State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 
584, 588 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Moreover, the temporal proximity and lack of intervening factors between the 
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frisk and Bertoch's statements solidify the need to suppress Bertoch's statements. 
Between the illegal frisk and Bertoch's pre-Miranda incriminating statements, there is no 
time lapse or intervening factors to "support a determination of attenuation." Lovegren , 
829 P.2d at 159. Immediately after illegally discovering the pipe, with his hands still on 
Bertoch's pockets, Witte exploited his discovery by stating, "This is a pipe," and 
compelling Bertoch to confess and volunteer incriminating evidence. R. 92; 289:7-8, 18-
19; see Lovegren, 829 P.2d at 159 (holding a time lapse and "intervening factors simply 
do not exist" where officer's "attempt to obtain Defendants' consent to search occurred 
within the course of the prior illegal conduct; it was nothing more than a continuation of 
the illegal detention of Defendants' vehicle"). 
Similarly, between the frisk and Bertoch's post-Miranda statements, no time lapse 
or intervening factors support a determination of attenuation.5 The record "demonstrates 
a very short period of time elapsed between" the frisk and Bertoch's post-Miranda 
statements. See Small 829 P.2d at 130. Bertoch was stopped at 9:03 p.m. and received 
his Miranda warnings at 10:26 p.m., during which time the exploitation continuously 
escalated. R. 80; 81; 92; 96; 99; 105; 107-08; 289:5, 7-9, 13, 18-19.; see_ Section I.C.2.a. 
Moreover, there were no intervening circumstances to sever the taint from the 
5
 Giving Miranda warnings does not per se sever the taint of police illegality from 
a confession. See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 691 n. 4 (Utah 1990) (noting in Brown 
v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590 (1975), the United States Supreme Court "rejected a per se rule 
that the giving of Miranda warnings is a sufficient break in the chain of events between 
the arrest and the confession"). 
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incriminating statements. To be intervening, circumstances "must be independent of the 
illegal police conduct.'1 Bello, 871 P.2d at 588 (citation omitted). Here, the DUI 
investigation was not an intervening circumstance because it never would have escalated 
to an arrest if Witte had not known Bertoch was carrying a pipe. See Section I.C. 1.; see 
also Bello, 871 P.2d at 589 (holding "fact that [officer] smelled marijuana when he 
approached the car is not an intervening circumstance because the opportunity to smell 
the marijuana arose directly from the illegal stop" (citation omitted)). 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED BY RULING THE STATEMENTS TAKEN 
BEFORE THE MIRANDA READING WERE ADMISSIBLE 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that no person 
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. 
Amend. V. Similarly, the Utah Constitution guarantees the "accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself." Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 12. 
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held the Fifth Amendment requires 
"an accused person in custody must be advised, prior to the time a statement is taken, that 
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him, that he 
has the right to an attorney, and that an attorney will be provided for him if he cannot 
afford to have one."6 Salt Lake City v. Carner. 664 P.2d 1168, 1170 n. 2 (Utah 1983). 
6
 Utah courts have not "specifically held that Miranda-type warnings are required 
under the Utah Constitution," but have made clear that the Utah Constitution's right 
against self-incrimination does not offer "broader protections than those available under 
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MThe standard for determining when a defendant is 'in custody' for Miranda purposes is 
well-settled." State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 1996). A person is in 
custody when "the setting is custodial or accusatory rather than investigatory." Carner, 
664 P.2d at 1170; see Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1146 (holding "Miranda warnings are 
required whenever the circumstances of an interrogation are such that they 4exert[] upon 
[the] detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege 
against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights'" 
(quoting Berkemerv.McCartv, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984))). In other words, "at the point 
the environment becomes custodial or accusatory, a police officer's questions must be 
prefaced with a Miranda warning." Carner, 664 P.2d at 1170. 
"In the context of a routine traffic stop, the driver and the passengers, even though 
they have been stopped and, at least momentarily, are not free to leave, are not i n 
custody' for Miranda purposes." Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147 (quoting Berkemer, 468 
U.S. at 440); see Carner, 664 P.2d at 1170 (same). "That is true even though an officer 
engages in some degree of accusatory questioning of the driver during the course of the 
stop and even though the officer may have a subjective, unstated intent to arrest." 
Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442). Instead, "[w]hether one 
is 'in custody' for Miranda purposes depends on an objective assessment of the 
circumstances of the interrogation with respect to the compulsory nature of the 
United Supreme Court decisions." Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147 n. 2. 
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interrogation rather than on the subjective intent or suspicions of the officers conducting 
the examination." Mirquet. 914 P.2d at 1147 (quoting Beckwith v. United States . 425 
U.S. 341, 345-48 (1976)). The factors for "determining whether an accused who has not 
been formally arrested is in custody" are: "(1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether the 
investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were 
present; and (4) the length and form of interrogation." Carner. 664 P.2d at 1171. 
For example, in Mirquet, an officer stopped the defendant for speeding and asked 
the defendant to get into the patrol car to see his speed reading. Mirquet. 914 P.2d at 
1145. While the defendant was in the patrol car, the officer smelled marijuana and said, 
"It's obvious to me you've been smoking marijuana. You know, there's no question in 
my mind. Would you like to go to the car and get the marijuana, or do you want me to 
go get it?" Id at 1146. In response, the defendant retrieved marijuana from his vehicle. 
Id. The officer then searched the vehicle, finding cocaine, marijuana and paraphernalia. 
Id. On appeal, our supreme court determined the defendant was in custody because the 
investigation was focused solely on the defendant, the objective indicia of arrest were 
present, the officer's statement displayed a "clear coercive intent," and the defendant's 
presence in the patrol car added to the coercion. IcL_ at 1147-48. In reaching its decision 
the supreme court focused heavily on the officer's statement. Id. at 1148. Specifically, it 
said "accusatory questioning is a relevant factor in the overall custody determination," 
and held, "In this case, the accusatory questioning-in truth a virtual command-was to 
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retrieve evidence of a crime that was clearly incriminating and, under all the 
circumstances, strongly supports the conclusion that [defendant] was in custody." IcL_ 
Similarly, in this case, Bertoch's pre-Miranda statements should have been 
suppressed because they were elicited during custodial interrogation. First, the 
investigation focused solely on Bertoch. Bertoch was alone in the car and, even though 
he had been driving safely and was acting cooperatively, he was targeted for an intrusive 
body frisk. R. 92; 107; 289:6, 13-14, 16-17. Second, the objective indicia of arrest were 
present. From the moment Witte felt the pipe, Bertoch knew he was under arrest. R. 92; 
107; 289:7-8, 18-19. Witte made this amply clear by informing Bertoch that he knew the 
object in Bertoch's pocket was paraphernalia. R. 92; 289:7, 18-19. Even though Witte 
instructed Bertoch to leave the evidence in his pocket, Bertoch knew he had been caught 
in possession of an illegal substance and was not going to be released. R. 92. 
Third, the length and form of the interrogation showed Bertoch was in custody. 
When Witte felt the pipe, he said, "This is a pipe." R. 92; 289:7, 18-19. Witte 
immediately knew Bertoch was carrying paraphernalia, and Bertoch immediately knew 
Witte knew. IcL Accordingly, Witte's statement went beyond investigatory questioning 
or accusatory questioning. Id. It even went beyond commanding Bertoch to retrieve 
incriminating evidence. LI It was a direct accusation-a statement that Witte knew 
Bertoch was guilty and that this was no longer a temporary traffic stop. R. 92; 289:7-8, 
17-19, 22-23. Accordingly, rather than leaving Bertoch to guess his rights and how best 
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to proceed, Witte should have read Bertoch his Miranda rights. See Dovle v. Ohio. 426 
U.S. 610, 617 (1976) ("The warnings, mandated by \ Miranda] as a prophylactic means of 
safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights,.. . require that a person taken into custody be 
advised immediately that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says may be 
used against him, and that he has a right to retained or appointed counsel before 
submitting to interrogation."). Instead, Witte forced Bertoch to proceed without any 
knowledge of his rights. R. 92; 289:7-8, 18-19. For over an hour, Witte subjected 
Bertoch to questioning, field sobriety tests, an additional body search, a vehicle search, 
two rides in a patrol car, and a blood test, all while making note of Bertoch's 
incriminating statements but without ever informing Bertoch of his Miranda rights. R. 
80; 92; 96; 99; 105; 107-08; 289:5, 7-9, 13, 18-19. Thus, this Court should reverse 
because Bertoch's pre-Miranda statements were elicited during custodial interrogation 
and should have been suppressed.7 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Bertoch's conviction because the trial court erred by 
denying Bertoch's motion to suppress the evidence taken in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment and by denying Bertoch's motion to suppress the statements taken in 
7
 Prejudice need not be shown because this issue is raised pursuant to a 
conditional guilty plea. See State v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1274 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) (holding in conditional plea context, appellate court must presume prejudice); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i) ("A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to 
withdraw the [conditional plea of guilty]."). 
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violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
SUBMITTED this \d*- day of January, 2004. 
LORI J. SEPPI 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, LORI J. SEPPI, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight copies of 
the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 
\lV- day of January, 2004. 
LORI J. SEPPI 
DELIVERED this day of January, 2004. 
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SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 011919305 FS 
Judge: DENNIS M. FUCHS 
Date: December 16, 2002 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendypg 
Prosecutor: COLBY, MICHAEL S 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): M KARLYNN HINMAN 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 26, 1972 
Video 
Tape Number: VIDEO Tape Count: 9:37 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/04/2002 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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Case No: 011919305 
Date: Dec 16, 2002 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time suspended for 
this charge is 0 day(s). 
Credit is granted for time served. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $5000.00 
Suspended: $3 800.00 
Surcharge: $551.35 
Due: $1200.00 
Total Fine: $5000.00 
Total Suspended: $3800.00 
Total Surcharge: $551.35 
Total Principal Due: $1200.00 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1200.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
The defendant to enter into and complete the Cognitive 
Restructuring classes approved by the Court or Probation Officer. 
Complete inpatient substance abuse treatment at First Step House. 
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COURT WILL GRANT AN EARLY RELEASE ONCE A BED IS SECURED AT FIRST 
STEP HOUSE. 




Page 3 ( last) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM B 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-1-
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






Case No. 011919305 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Ruling 
Electronically Recorded on 
September 30, 2002 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE DENNIS M. FUCHS 
Third District Court Judge 
For the Plaintiff: Katherine Bernards-Goodman 
Salt Lake Cnty Dist Atty 
231 East 400 South, Ste 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
For the Defendant: M. Karlvnn Hinman 
722 Shepard Lane, Ste. 104 
Farmington, UT 84025-3845 
Telephone: (801)447-4288 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT 
1909 SOUTH WASHINGTON AVENUE 
PROVO, UTAH 84606 
TELEPHONE: (801)377-0027 
L to- ri t 
JaaZhill CA Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 2 -
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on September 30, 2002) 
3 THE COURT: Let's get on the record in the matter of 
4 Travis Bertoch, 011919305. This is on for motions. The Court 
5 heard argument last week, took it under advisement again so I 
6 could renew — or review again all of the memorandums, which I 
7 have done. 
8 I think we excused Mr. Bertoch from being here today, 
9 didn't we? Or is he supposed to be here? 
10 MS. HINMAN: I believe, unfortunately, you said he 
11 needed to be here, your Honor, and I tried to reach him, and I 
12 also spoke with his brother. He did not have this on his 
13 calendar, and I haven't been able to reach him. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Well, he was here when I set it, so 
15 we can issue a warrant— 
16 MS. HINMAN: Well, he was not here on Friday because 
17 he had been excused— 
18 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm going to issue a warrant 
19 in the amount of $5,000, but you can cure that by just telling 
20 me that you've talked to Mr. Bertoch and you've been in touch 
21 with him, okay? 
22 MS. HINMAN: All right, fine. Your Honor, we expect 
23 I to be in West Valley City on a misdemeanor matter tomorrow 
24 | morning, I'm sure, if not before then. I will— 
25 | THE COURT: Okay, I just need to know that he shows up 
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1 for that, okay? 
2 MS. HINMAN: Thank you very much, your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: All right. In regards to the motion, the 
4 Court is going to deny defense's motions for the following 
5 reasons. The first one was suppressing the statements 
6 defendant made after the stop. I'm denying it. The Court's 
7 considering it to be an investigatory stop. It was a DUI stop. 
8 Even though he could smell alcohol — the officer 
9 could smell alcohol — that is not enough in and of itself a 
10 probable cause for an arrest. Mr. Bertoch was not under 
11 arrest. This matter has been heard by Courts many times. The 
12 Court did not consider him under arrest, and the questions 
13 asked by the officer are preliminary investigatory questions 
14 such as, "Have you been drinking," and I think in this 
15 particular case Mr. Bertoch volunteered that he had a couple of 
16 beers, but the Court does not feel that he was in custody, and 
17 therefore Miranda had to be given before the statements could 
18 be admitted. 
19 Also, when the officer found the lump in his pocket 
20 and stated just to Mr. Bertoch that it felt like a pipe, the 
21 defendant responded on his own that it was a pipe, and then he 
22 also volunteered the information that he had marijuana and — 
23 I can't — I think a lighter in his other pocket. He also 
24 volunteered that he had been smoking marijuana. Again, these 
25 were still investigatory questions. 
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1 The Court finds that the Terry frisk was appropriate 
2 and legal. Once the officer smelled alcohol and took 
3 Mr. Bertoch out of the vehicle, he had a right to frisk 
4 him. 
5 I went through the prelim, I went through the 
6 statements of the officer. I didn't find any evidence 
7 where the officer reached in his pocket and took these things 
8 out. It was Mr. Bertoch that volunteered that it was a pipe, 
9 and even though it could have been a pipe of tobacco or 
10 anything, at that point it didn't make a difference. There 
11 wasn't evidence about anything. The officer even told 
12 Mr. Bertoch to keep the matter — the pipe and the other 
13 material in his pockets until later. 
14 I think that the initial stop was lawful because 
15 the license plate was unlawfully displayed, and the Court of 
16 Appeals and the Supreme Court have both told us that basically 
17 no matter how minute, if a traffic violation takes place, that 
18 gives rise to probable cause for the initial stop. 
19 In regards to the suppression of the pipe and the 
20 baggie containing a green leafy substance, the Court both 
21 finds that these were taken at the search incident to arrest. 
22 Mr. Bertoch was later arrested. At that point, the officer 
23 asked him to empty his pockets or to take out what was in his 
24 pockets, and that's when they were brought out. 
25 In the suppression of the zig-zag papers, the Court 
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1 denies that motion. The Court either feels that one, it was 
2 found during the inventory search of the vehicle after the 
3 arrest was made, or it was found in the search incident to 
4 arrest at the time that Mr. Bertoch was arrested, even though 
5 it was done by a different officer. 
6 Even though — and again, even though the papers 
7 themselves are not illegal, I mean these are questions for 
8 the jury whether they think that zig-zag papers are drug 
9 paraphernalia or not. Based on the other evidence found and 
10 Mr. Bertoch's admitting he smoked marijuana, the Court can 
11 surely believe that it's for the use of marijuana, but I'm not 
12 the fact finder in this particular case. I'm only asked 
13 whether to suppress them or not, so it will be allowed. 
14 Suppressing all the other statements because 
15 Mr. Bertoch did not understand the Miranda warnings, I have 
16 heard no testimony whatsoever in any way that Mr. Bertoch was 
17 incapacitated to a point that he couldn't understand Miranda. 
18 He said that he understood it, and he then proceeded to ask the 
19 questions. I think that burden is on the defense and I don't 
20 think they've met that burden. 
21 Suppression of the battery case with the meth. Yes, 
22 there is some confusion as to whether it was a plastic case, a 
23 battery case that contained meth or a clear plastic case — a 
24 white — excuse me, some of it was. It was a white battery 
25 case containing meth. In other reports it was a clear case 
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that contained a white powdery substance. 
One, I don't find those to be that much of a 
discrepancy between what is being described. Two, I think 
that that again is a question for the trier of fact as to 
whether they believe that was the particular battery case 
that was found on Mr. Bertoch or not. 
Also, in regards to the chain, the Court isn't 
necessarily agreeing that it will come in, I'm just not 
suppressing it. If each individual officer can establish 
that that was the piece of evidence that they found and they 
handled, then the chain allows it to come in and then the 
jury gives it what weight they seem to think it deserves. 
Just because there's a misidentification — it's not 
even a misidentification. It's a different description of the 
same piece of evidence. I don't think in and of itself that is 
grounds to suppress the evidence. 
In regards to the stopping — a profile stop because 
Mr. Bertoch had his head shaved and because the officer might 
have thought that he was a straight-edger, I've just heard 
no — there's been nothing to that. 
There was a legitimate traffic violation that took 
place, and the officer stopped him for a legitimate reason. If 
the officer didn't have a traffic violation and yes, he just 
stopped him for no apparent reason whatsoever, then maybe the 
Court would look more seriously at that, but based on what I've 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-7-
1 heard there's nothing to show that the stop was initially 
2 unlawful and was therefore a profile stop. 
3 So based on that, the Court is going to deny each and 
4 every one of defense's motions. Do you want to set it for 
5 trial? 
6 COURT CLERK: It is set for trial. 
7 THE COURT: It is set for next week, okay. 
8 COURT CLERK: No, this week, Wednesday, Thursday and 
9 Friday. 
10 1 THE COURT: Okay. So as it stands right now it will 
11 go to trial, depending on where it sits with the other — I 
12 don't — we haven't even seen everybody as to the trials that 
13 are set for Wednesday, so I don't know what place setting it 
14 has* 
15 COURT CLERK: Right now it's No. 2. 
16 THE COURT: Right now it's a No. 2 setting. Okay? 
17 I MR. BERTOCH: Okay. 
18 | THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
19 | (Hearing concluded) 
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